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Economic Reform in China
Future historians will no doubt say that one
of the most momentous world developments
during the last quarter of the twentieth century
was the near total collapse of socialist economies
in the fall of 1989. They will likely also note that
the events were preceded by ten years of bold
economic reform in China, with remarkable
successes as well as failures.
Today, it is striking to see that the serious
difficulties China encountered in its efforts
to reform have significantly slowed down the
reform's forward momentum. The future of that
vast country, with one-fourth of the world's pop-
ulation, will depend critically on whether it can
successfully overcome these difficulties and
resume reform. At the same time, as the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe move toward reform,
there is serious concern that they not fall into the
same traps that China encountered. For China
and for the rest of the world, therefore, it is im-
portant to gain a sound assessment of China's
economic reform experience of the last ten years.
The topic is obviously too large to be adequately
covered in this Letter; moreover, much research
yet remains to be done. This Letter can present
no more than a short preliminary survey. It begins
with a review of China's economic reform in the
1980s, assesses its present status, and then spec-
ulates on its likely course in the future.
Past Experience
Overall, China's economic reform was a
tremendous success. It opened up a huge
reservoir of productive energy and enterprising
spirit which had been dammed up by rigid eco-
nomic planning. During the ten years from 1979
to 1989, the national output grew at an average
rate of 9.5 percent a year, which compares
favorably with the growth record of any country
in the world. The result was a very substantial
rise in the standard of living ofthe population,
especially those living in the cities and in the
countryside of the booming coastal provinces.
Problems began to crop up by 1986. The most
obvious was inflation, which accelerated rapidly
to culminate in a nationwide run on banks and
panic buying in the summer of 1988. The situa-
tion was obviously untenable. Something drastic
had to be done. In September 1988, the reform
was suspended, and a nationwide austerity pro-
gram was imposed.
What went wrong? In hindsight, many things
went wrong, even before their symptoms became
obvious by 1988.
In the first place, the root of inflation lay in an
abrupt shift from a centrally planned economy
to a semi-market economy without first installing
institutions and instruments that are essential
for effective implementation of macroeconomic
policy. Reform conferred considerable autonomy
on enterprises in their production and spending
decisions, supposedly in simulation of decision-
making in a market economy. However, what
was overlooked was that in market economies
business decisions are tempered by national
monetary and fiscal policies. In China, banks
had only limited experience and authority to
carry out effective monetary policy for influenc-
ing business decisions. Effective fiscal policy was
hampered by the lack of an operational modern
taxation system and by the heavy burden of gov-
ernment subsidies to maintain urban standards
of living.
Under these circumstances, once given auton-
omy, enterprises went on spending sprees, fueled
by excessive bank lending in the name of stimu-
lating and sustaining economic growth. Although
wage rates were still centrally regulated, gener-
ous bonuses were given out, whether justified
by productivity increases or not. Supported by
accommodative bankers, enterprises raced to
expand factory facilities and build apartments for
workers in an overcrowded nation long suffering
from severe housing shortages.
The ensuing explosion of aggregate demand
was like the fabled uncorking of the bottle that
released the genie. As the genie demonstrated
great magic power, the people, the government,
and the entire outside world were enthralled.FABSF
Then, it was discovered that there were no strings
to keep the genie in check. As price increases
accelerated, the people panicked.
Second, the ten years of reform did not funda-
mentally alter the nation's industrial structure. To
this day, state enterprises still account for 60 per-
cent of the nation's total industrial product, urban
collectives 17 percent, rural enterprises another
17 percent, with the remaining 6 percent ac-
counted for by joint ventures and private enter-
prises. Despite the reforms, urban collectives
remain subject to tight controls by local govern-
ments. Thus, over three-fourths ofthe nation's
industrial output is still in the hands of managers
who have limited incentives and accountability
in their job performance. Whatever economic
dynamism there was in the last ten years arose
mainly from agriculture-which was essentially
freed from government controls as early as
1980-as weii as from the rapidly expanding
rural- and private-enterprise industrial sectors.
In contrast, the state enterprises and urban
collectives have remained heavy drags on the
economy.
Third, because of concerns over inflation, the
authorities were hesitant to lift price controls
altogether. Instead, they installed a two-tiered
price system, with output within quota to be sold
at regulated, below-market prices and output
above quota at free-market prices. The intention
was to provide a transitional period to gradually
phase out the quotas and allow enterprises time
to adjust to the expanding free-market prices.
However, because of inflation fears, the intended
phasing-out was not fully carried out. In the
meantime, the system created vast opportunities
for business managers and local government offi-
cials to arbitrage between the quota prices and
market prices, and make handsome profits for
themselves. Corruption was rampant. It stirred
up seething social discontent and eroded pop-
ular enthusiasm for reform.
Fourth, decentralization of economic decision-
making degenerated into regional fragmentation.
Ostensibly, decentralization was meant to shift
power to local governments, which are closer
than the central government to the localities they
serve. In fact, however, the local governments
soon became entrenched in regional economic
interests to the extent of practicing regional eco-
nomic protectionism. In order to foster regional
economic growth and protect local jobs, vast
subsidies were extended to inefficient industries.
Barriers to inter-regional movement of goods and
services were erected, especially on materials
and energy that were in stringent supply, and on
skilled labor and highly valued technical or man-
agerial personnel. At times, even inter-regional
clearance of bank funds was hampered. The re-
sult was waste and inefficiency on a grand scale,
as well as obstruction of the implementation of
national monetary and fiscal policies.
Present status
In September 1988 an austerity program was
imposed in order to gain control over a runaway
inflation. The program consisted of tight reins on
bank credit, drastic cutbacks on business invest-
ment and on government spending, reinstate-
ment of price controls, and restrictions on foreign
trade. However, not all aspects were strictly
enforced until after the summer of 1989.
The resuit of the austerity program has been
dramatic. The retail price inflation rate dropped
from 27 percent in the first half of 1989 to 6
percent by the year's end and 0.6 percent in the
third quarter of 1990. The success in controlling
inflation, however, was purchased at a high eco-
nomic cost. The nation's industrial growth rate
fell from 18 percent a year in the fourth quarter of
1988 to nearly zero a year later. Unemployment
soared, and enterprises were laden with huge
stocks of unsold goods. Particularly hard hit was
the dynamic rural enterprise sector, which was
denied access to bank credit and essential indus-
trial materials, in order to sustain the inefficient,
loss-incurring state enterprises. Widespread un-
employment created serious social problems,
with which the government was
ill-equipped to cope,for lack of an operative
unemployment compensation system.
Toward the end of 1989, as pressure mounted,
the authorities began to release massive amounts
of bank credit to enterprises in an effort to revive
the economy. Total bank loans to enterprises rose
40 percent at an annual rate during the fourth
quarter of 1989, compared to an average 14 per-
cent a year during the preceding four quarters.
Bank lending continued to grow at a rapid rate
in 1990. In addition, the authorities relented on
their policy of suppressing rural enterprises and
allowed them increased access to credit and
materials.Industrial output revived with a considerable lag.
Its annual growth rate stayed near zero in the first
quarter of 1990, rising to 5 percent by the third
quarter, but jumped to 14 percent in the fourth
quarter. At the same time, however, signs of re-
newed inflationary pressures have appeared, as
the retail price inflation rate leaped to an esti-
mated 10 percent in the fourth quarter of 1990.
All in all, the authorities must be given credit
for having brought inflation under control. The
cost to the economy was high, but probably in-
evitable and obviously manageable. However,
the task was accomplished not through the work-
ing of the market mechanism, but through re-
turning to mandatory controls. Past experience
has clearly demonstrated that such controls were
clumsy and fraught with problems, including
repeatedly throwing the economy into short
cycles of inflationary growth and sharp eco-
nomic slowdowns. Nevertheless, without an
institutionalframework for effective macroeco-
nomic adjustments, the authorities probably had
little choice but to resort to mandatory controls.
In the meantime, reform has slowed markedly.
A number of fundamental problems remain
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reformed, taxation has become more restrictive
and distortive as a result of a series of inappro-
priate patchwork measures, and rapidly rising
government subsidies have added an in-
creasingly unbearable burden to the budget.
Although rural industries and private enterprises
have been allowed more room to operate, the
problems of handling the large, inefficient state
enterprisesand urban collectives remain baffling.
Open corruption has abated, but the two-tiered
price system is still in place. Finally, economic
fragmentation continues to rank among the na-
tion's topmost problems, as regional economic
interests remain deeply and firmly entrenched.
Future prospects
Because so little progress has been made in
economic reform since September 1988, suspi-
cion is widespread that the authorities are anti-
reform. The suspicion, however, is ill-founded.
The benefits of the reform of the 1980s are too
obvious to be denied by even the most rabid
"conservatives:' There is today general agree-
ment in China, among the public as well as
within the government, that the country cannot
possibly return to the rigid planning controls that
prevailed prior to 1979. As stated, the purpose of
the partial restoration of mandatory control in
September 1988 was to curb inflation. Now that
inflation appears to be under control-gnawing
signs of its recent resurgence notwithstanding-
the next step should be to resume reform.
The question is how: how to transfOim a cen-
trally planned economy into a market-oriented
economy without generating unacceptably high
inflation and social dislocation? This is the same
question confronting many socialist countries
today. Despite China's ten years of reform expe-
rience, a successful transformation remains an
elusive goal. Once burned, twice shy. China
appears to be sitting out the current reform
movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe and watching on the sidelines to see
how it will turn out. In the meantime, it will
continue to make relatively minor adjustments
in its existing half-reformed economic structure,
in pursuit of "reform with stability:'
Bold economic reform in China was a hallmark
of the 1980s. As the 1990s opened, a more cau-
tious mood has set in, which is probably just
as well in view of the lessons that have been
learned from the experience of the preceding
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planned economy toward a more market-oriented
economy without first putting in place effective
safeguards and check-and-balance mechanisms
is likely to cause painful stumbles, at great cost
to a nation. History does not provide sufficient
evidence to tell whether or not the reward at the
end of such a move would be worth the cost.
One can understand, even sympathize with,
a desire for caution.
There is, however, only a thin line separating
caution and timidity. The litmus test lies in
whether or not caution is combined with an
active search for effective ways to deal with
the pitfalls that caused past economic reform
to stumble. Indications are encouraging. Re-
searchers in China, obviously under the direction
ofthe authorities, are hard at work attempting
to unravel the complex problems that have en-
snarled China's economic reform. Their success
or failure will affect not only the lives of the more
than one billion people in China, but those in
other socialist countries as well.
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